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IS THEISM REALLY A MIRACLE? 
Al vin Plantinga 
In this paper I outline and discuss the central claims and arguments of J. L. Mackie's 
The Miracle of Theism. Mackie argues, in essence, that none of the traditional theistic 
arguments is successful taken either one at a time or in tandem, that the theist does not 
have a satisfactory response to the problem of evil, and that on balance the theistic 
hypothesis is much less probable than is its denial. He then concludes that theism is 
unsatisfactory and rationally unacceptable. I argue that he is mistaken in nearly all of his 
major contentions. 
John Mackie's aim, in his posthumously published The Miracle of Theism I , 
is to "examine the arguments for and against the existence of God carefully and 
in some detail, taking account both of the traditional concept of God and of the 
traditional proofs of his existence and of more recent interpretations and 
approaches." Mackie assumes that the rational acceptability of theistic belief 
depends upon the outcome of this examination: if on balance the evidence favors 
theism, then theistic belief is rationally acceptable; if, on the other hand, the 
evidence favors atheism, then theism is not rationally acceptable. He is less than 
sanguine about the prospects of theism on this point; how much less can be 
gathered from the fact that the title of the book is taken from Hume's ironic 
suggestion that 
upon the whole, we may conclude that the Christian Religion not only 
was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be 
believed by any reasonable person without one .... Whoever is moved 
by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own 
person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives 
him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and 
experience. 2 
Like Hume, Mackie apparently believes that it is only by way of a miracle that 
a rational person could accept the belief that there is such a person as God, let 
alone the much more extensive claims of any of the theistic religions. 
The book displays many virtues. Like Mackie's other works, it is forcefully 
argued and for the most part clearly written. Many writings about religion betray 
a tacit assumption to the effect that if what you say is clear enough to be 
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understood, it is probably too superficial to be worth saying; there is no hint of 
this deplorable attitude in this book. Further, Mackie takes theism and theistic 
religion as involving genuine claims about the world, rather than as expressions 
of attitude, or of moral resolve, or some such thing; he takes with real seriousness 
the question of the rationality of theistic belief, and he tries to give both sides 
a fair and honest hearing. He holds that the topics he discusses are properly 
approached by way of careful and clear argumentation: "It is my view that the 
question whether there is or is not a god can and should be discussed rationally 
and reasonably, and that such discussion can be rewarding, in that it can yield 
definite results. This is a genuine, meaningful question, and an important one-
too important for us to take sides about it casually or arbitrarily" (1). There is 
about Mackie's book an engagingly straightforward character; he is impatient 
with obfuscation and muddy thinking in others and does his best to avoid it 
himself. Mackie makes some telling points in considering Swinburne's prob-
abilistic theistic arguments; there is also a good discussion of D. Z. Phillips' 
work, and a penetrating account of William James, with whom he apparently 
has some sympathy. 
I must add, however, that I find myself in disagreement with Mackie with 
respect to nearly all of his main contentions and claims. His treatment of some 
of the main topics he considers, furthermore, seem to me to be deeply flawed 
and fundamentally unsatisfactory. Still further, in approaching these matters as 
he does, he makes several enormous assumptions, apparently without so much 
as noticing that these assumptions are both eminently debatable and in fact widely 
debated. On balance, therefore, I think the book leaves a great deal to be desired. 
In Part I of what follows I shall outline and critically evaluate what Mackie 
has to say about some of the arguments for the existence of God; in Part II I 
shall consider what he has to say by way of offering evidence against the existence 
of God; then in part III I shall point out and comment upon the debatable (and 
in my view false) assumptions upon which the whole work depends. 
I. ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 
The subtitle of the book is "Arguments for and against the existence of God." 
The topic of the book is not just these arguments, however; the topic is really 
theistic belief, and in particular the rationality of theistic belief. Mackie clearly 
holds that the rationality of belief in God stands or falls with the arguments for 
and against the existence of God: if the argumentsforGod's existence are stronger 
than the arguments against his existence, then theism is rationally acceptable; 
on the other hand if the arguments against God's existence are stronger, then it 
is irrational or somehow improper to believe in God. 
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(a) THE ARGUMENT FROM MIRACLES 
The first argument Mackie considers is "an argument whose main premiss is 
that such and such remarkable events have occurred, and whose conclusion is 
that a god of the traditional sort both exists and intervenes, from time to time, 
in the ordinary world" (13); not surprisingly, he finds the argument wanting. 
Here (apart from a qualification or two) Mackie follows Hume, who apparently 
held that no one could rationally believe in a miracle. "A miracle is a violation 
of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established 
these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as 
entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."3 Mackie 
follows Hume in holding that a miracle must be (among other things) a violation 
of a law of nature: "we must keep in the definition the notion of a violation of 
natural law" (p. 19). The latter, he says, is a description of the way "in which 
the world-including, of course, human beings-works when left to itself, when 
not interfered with. A miracle occurs when the world is not left to itself, when 
something distinct from the natural order as a whole intrudes into it" (20). 
This is, of course, a deistic rather than a theistic conception of a law of nature; 
on the theistic conception the world is never "left to itself' but is always (at the 
least) conserved in being by God. Nor can we take Mackie's suggestion counter-
factually, as the suggestion that a law of nature describes the world as it would 
be if it were left to its own devices; for (again, on the theistic conception) if the 
world were left to its own devices, apart from the conserving activity of God, 
it would no longer so much as exist; it isn't possible that the world exist apart 
from the conserving activity of God. So there are substantial initial problems 
with the account of miracle and natural law. 
The main problem, however, lies in a different direction. For Mackie also 
endorses Hume's claim that any miracle runs contrary to "firm and unalterable 
experience," so that a miracle will be maximally improbable: 
it is therefore not enough for the defender of a miracle to cast doubt 
(as well he might) on the certainty of our knowledge of the law of 
nature that seems to have been violated. For he must himself say that 
this is a law of nature: otherwise the reported event will not be miracul-
ous. That is, he must in effect concede to Hume that the antecedent 
improbability of this event is as high as it could be, hence that, apart 
from the testimony, we have the strongest possible grounds for believing 
that the alleged event did not occur. This event must, by the miracle 
advocate's own admission, be contrary to a genuine, not merely a 
supposed law of nature, and therefore maximally improbable. It is this 
maximal improbability that the weight of the testimony would have to 
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overcome (25). 
Here Mackie seems to endorse the following two premises: 
(I) A miracle is a violation of a law of nature 
(2) The antecedent improbability of any violation of a law of nature is 
maximal; 
he then concludes, naturally enough, that the defender of miracles has a tough 
row to hoe. 
This argument, however, is considerably less than imperforate. Suppose we 
ignore, for the moment, the difficulties afflicting the first premise and for purposes 
of argument temporarily concede Mackie's deistic conception of laws of nature. 
Why should we suppose that a violation of a law of nature, (taken Mackie's 
way) is maximally improbable (prior to testimony) on our evidence? On Mackie's 
conception, a law of nature describes the way the world works when it is not 
interfered with (for example, by God); but why should we think it is particularly 
improbable that it be interfered with? The antecedent probability of a miracle, 
for me, depends upon what I know and believe about the world; but perhaps I 
have no reason to suppose that the world is not regularly interfered with. Why 
couldn't interferences with nature be the rule rather than the exception? Perhaps 
God doesn't ordinarily leave nature to herself, but takes a hand in what happens. 
(Indeed, if you accept both Mackie's account of laws of nature and a theistic 
conception of the relation of God to the world, you will suppose that it is only 
by reason of a continuing miracle that the world continues to exist; everything, 
not merely theistic belief, is a miracle.) 
But secondly, suppose we go even further with Mackie. Suppose we concede 
that violations of laws of nature almost never occur; indeed, suppose we concede, 
for purposes of argument, that laws of nature are in fact exceptionless. It still 
won't follow either that they all enjoy a particularly high probability with respect 
to what I know, or that violations of them are extraordinarily improbable. Perhaps 
it is true that all A's are B's; how does it follow that this proposition has maximal 
probability with respect to my evidence? My experience with A's may be limited. 
Perhaps it is a law of nature that all quarks have some property P--charm, or 
delight, or winsomeness, let us say; why should it follow that the proposition 
All quarks are winsome is maximally probable (or even more probable than not) 
with respect to what I know? I may (and in fact do) know next to nothing about 
quarks and their properties, and a few years ago, the same was true for everyone. 
No doubt at present there are laws of nature such that none of us know much 
of anything about the sorts of entities they involve; violation of those laws, then, 
need not be particularly improbable with respect to what we know. 
As a matter of fact it could be that what is in fact a violation of a law of 
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nature not only wasn't particularly improbable with respect to our evidence, but 
was in fact more probable than not with respect to it. Suppose (as has been the 
case for various groups of people at various times in the past) we knew nothing 
about whales except what can be garnered by rather distant visual observation. 
Now it might be a law of nature that whales have some property P (mammalian 
construction, for example) that can be detected only by close examination; but 
it might also be the case that we know that most things that look and behave 
more or less like whales do not have this property P. Then the proposition S is 
a whale and does not have P could very well be more probable than not with 
respect to our evidence, even though it is contrary to a law of nature. It is 
therefore wholly mistaken to assume, as do Mackie and Hume, that any violation 
of a law of nature will be maximally improbable with respect to our evidence. 
Taken this way, therefore, the argument has little enough to recommend it; 
it's second premiss seems flatly false. But perhaps we can improve the argument 
by revising that premiss. Perhaps (so Mackie and Hume should say) what is 
maximally improbable is not the proposition that E, (which is in fact a violation 
of a law of nature) has occurred, but rather the proposition E has occurred and 
E is a violation of a law of nature. But this brings us back to the above point 
about interferences with nature: why should a theist think such a proposition is 
maximally improbable? (Indeed, why should anyone think so? We aren't given 
a priori that nature is seldom interfered with.) Even if a theist thinks of miracles 
as violations of laws of nature (and that is probably not the best way to think 
of them) she needn't think it improbable in excelsis that a miracle occur; so why 
couldn't she perfectly sensibly believe, on the basis of sufficient testimony, that 
some particular miraculous event has occurred? 
A bit later in his discussion, Mackie seems to retract his claim that violations 
of laws of nature are maximally improbable for all of us; since theists agree 
"that there is an omnipotent deity, ... they cannot find it absurd to suppose that 
such a being will occasionally interfere with the course of nature" (27). He goes 
on to suggest that the claim does hold for atheists and agnostics. This too, 
however, seems mistaken, both for the reasons given in the whale case above, 
and because an agnostic (or even an atheist) need not think it particularly unlikely 
that God exists; such a person could then think it false that there are violations 
of laws of nature, but not maximally improbable that there are. Mackie's discus-
sion of the argument from miracles, therefore, is wholly inconclusive. 
(b) THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
In Chapter 2 Mackie discusses the theistic argument to be found in Descartes' 
Third meditation; he concludes that its prospects are not bright. In Chapter 4 he 
turns his attention to some versions of the ontological argument. One would not 
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initially expect him to be wildly enthusiastic about this argument, and indeed 
he is not. Mackie appears to think Kant showed that any version of the ontological 
argument must be unsound: 
Our argument has vindicated his [Kant's] thesis, showing that, even if, 
contrary to what Kant would allow, our concept of an object does 
contain existence, and involves it inextricably, as Descartes demands, 
we must still go outside that concept in order to ascribe existence to 
the object. Even if Xness includes existence in just the way that Descartes 
postulates, it is still a further question whether there is an X or not, 
since the judgement that there are no Xs would, even on this supposition, 
involve no contradiction. It is this that establishes the impossibility of 
an ontological proof (49). 
Now this argument, if it is correct, shows at most the impossibility of a certain 
kind of proposed proof: one which, so to speak, proposes to prove the existence 
of God by finding existence included in the concept of God or in the property 
being God. (A property P includes a property p* if and only if it is not possible 
that there be an object that exemplifies P but does not exemplify P*; a property 
P includes existence, therefore, if and only if it is not possible that there be an 
object that exemplifies P and does not exist.) 
Mackie is right, I think, in rejecting arguments of this kind. Such an argu-
ment would proceed as follows: on analysis we can see that (1) the concept 
of God (or of the being than which it is not possible that there be a greater) 
includes existence (in the above sense); but then (2) it will be necessarily false 
that God does not exist, and hence (3) it is necessarily true that God does exist. 
A powerful objection to this style of argument is that it is either straightforwardly 
fallacious or else implicitly presupposes that there are or could be things that do 
not exist. For given step (1), what follows at step (2) is only that it is not possible 
that the concept of God be exemplified by a thing that does not exist; but then 
we can move to step (3) only if we are given that the property of being God is 
indeed exemplified. One who argues in this way must therefore be understood 
as beginning with the supposition that the property of being God is indeed 
exemplified (if only "in the mind"); he then goes on to argue that the being that 
exemplifies the property or concept in question must also exist in reality-i.e., 
exist. 
Suppose we use the term 'actualism" to denote the view that there neither are 
nor could have been things that do not exist. Then the chief problem with this 
style of argument is that it presupposes the falsehood of actualism. For if actualism 
is true, every concept or property includes existence; no concept is or could have 
been exemplified by something that does not exist, since it is not possible that 
there be a thing that does not exist. So the property being the meanest man in 
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North Dakota, for example, includes existence; but of course it will not follow 
that there exists a meanest man in North Dakota. The problem with the above 
style of ontological argument, from an actualist perspective, is just that its initial 
assumption-that the property being God (or being the being than which it is 
not possible that there be a greater) is exemplified-whether or not the thing 
that exemplifies it exists in reality-must be rejected. If actualism is true, that 
property is exemplified if and only if there exists something that exemplifies it; 
since it is not possible that there be something that does not exist, it is not 
possible that this property be exemplified by something that does not exist. 
Kant's puzzling and obscure but suggestive obiter dicta on these matters can 
most charitably be seen, I think, as an early endorsement of actualism. Perhaps 
what Kant is claiming, when he says that existence is not a real property or 
predicate, is just that existence is included (in the above sense) in every property 
or concept, so that it can only be redundantly added to a concept. But that 
suggestion is equivalent to actualism, (given the obvious premise that anything 
there is will exemplify at least one property). And if actualism is true, then the 
above style of ontological argument will fail; at any rate on a very plausible 
interpretation of that argument' it presupposes that there are or could have been 
things that do not exist. 
But of course the ontological argument comes in a wide variety of versions, 
and this point suffices to refute only some of them. It is therefore incorrect to 
say, with Mackie, that this point "establishes the impossibility of an ontological 
argument" (unless what he means is that there is an ontological argument such 
that this point establishes the impossibility of that argument.) 
Mackie goes on to note that there are contemporary versions of the ontological 
argument put forward by Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm, and myself. 
He then turns his attention to the version of the argument I endorsed in The 
Nature of Necessity. That argument certainly has its problems (some of which 
are set forth with style and clarity in Peter van Inwagen's "Ontological Argu-
ments"6), but I can't see that Mackie manages to identify any difficulties for it 
here. Briefly, the argument in question goes as follows: 
(l) The proposition there is a maximally great being is possible in the 
broadly logical sense. 
Hence 
(2) There is a possible world in which there is a maximally great being. 
Now 
(3) Necessarily, a being with maximal greatness would be necessarily 
existent and would have (at least) omnipotence, omniscience and 
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moral perfection essentially. 
But given the relatively uncontroversial further premiss that 
(4) What is necessary does not vary from possible world to possible 
world (so that if it is possible that p is necessary, then p is necessary). 
it follows that in fact there does exist a being that is necessarily existent and 
essentially omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good. 
Now while it is clear that Mackie disapproves of this argument,7 it is not easy 
to see precisely where his objection lies. He begins as follows: 
If we choose to play with possible worlds at all ... , we ordinarily assume 
that for any logically possible statement or conjunction of statements 
there is at least one possible world that realizes it. That is, we do 
ordinarily expect to be able to argue from non-contradiction to possibility 
and thence to a possible world. What has ruled out this pattern of 
inference, in Plantinga's system, is the introduction of world indexed 
properties. For the admission of these makes features of one world 
dependent in part on features of all other possible worlds. If each possible 
world were independent of every other, then we could allow the existence 
of a possible world for every maximal set of consistent sentences, and 
hence could say that every logical possibility is realized in at least one 
possible world (60). 
A page later he summarizes the objection: 
The admission of world-indexed properties, which is also essential for 
his version of the ontological proof, undermines both what I have called 
the crucial step [above, (3)] and the crucial premiss [above, 0)]. 
How, exactly, shall we understand this objection? It is by no means easy to 
make it explicit; I am inclined to think, however, that it essentially contains the 
following four assertions. (a) The above version of the ontological argument 
presupposes the existence of world-indexed properties (i .e., properties of the 
sort has P in W, where P is a property and Wa possible world), (b) the only 
reason we might have for accepting the inference of (2) from (I) in the argument 
is the idea that whatever is logically possible is true in some possible world, (c) 
if we hold that there are such things as world-indexed properties, then we will 
be obliged to deny that whatever is logically possible is true in some possible 
world; hence if we introduce world-indexed properties, we cannot properly make 
the step from (1) to (2), and (d) if we hold that there are world-indexed properties, 
then we will be obliged to give up (4), the premiss of the argument according 
to which what is possible or necessary does not vary from world to world. In a 
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nutshell: either we accept world-indexed properties or we do not. If we do not, 
then the argument immediately collapses; but if we do, then we lose premiss (4) 
as well as the inference from (l) to (2), so that once again the argument fails. 
Now (a) is clearly false; the above formulation makes no mention of world-
indexed properties. (Indeed, it is easy to state the argument just in terms of 
possibility and necessity, with no explicit reference to possible worlds at all.) It 
is perhaps easier to see how the conclusion follows from the premisses by thinking 
in terms of world-indexed properties, but appeal to such properties is a dispensible 
luxury. 
(b)-(d) furthermore, have equally grave problems. Consider (b) and (c). Mackie 
apparently holds that any proposition that is free from contradiction is logically 
possible, and hence true in some possible world. If we introduce world-indexed 
properties, however, then (he thinks) we lose this truth; for the introduction of 
such properties "makes features of one world dependent in part upon features 
of all other possible worlds" (60); and it will follow, Mackie thinks, that there 
will be logically possible propositions that are not true in any possible world 
(60). So if we introduce world-indexed properties, then, says Mackie, the 
resulting "system of possible worlds does not and cannot correspond to the full 
range of logical possibilities" (60). But then we can no longer say that a propo-
sition is logically possible if and only if it is true in some possible world; there 
will be logically possible propositions that are not true in any possible world. 
And hence the fact that the proposition there is a maximally great being is 
logically possible (because it is free from contradiction) gives us no reason to 
suppose that there is a possible world in which this proposition is true; but then 
there is no reason to accept the step from (1) to (2) and the argument collapses. 
What shall we make of these claims? In particular, what shall we make of his 
claim that we "expect to be able to argue from non-contradiction to possibility 
and thence to a possible world"? Here we must ask first what Mackie means by 
"non-contradiction" and "freedom from contradiction." He doesn't say what he 
means, but an informed guess would go as follows: a proposition is free from 
contradiction if and only if no explicit contradiction follows from it in ordinary 
logic-first order logic with identity, say. So a proposition is free from contradic-
tion if it is consistent in first order logic. 
But if this is what he means, then isn't he clearly mistaken? It isn't true at 
all that we ordinarily think we can argue from absence of contradiction in this 
sense to possibility and thence to truth in some possible world. There is no 
contradiction of this sort in the proposition that something is both red and green 
all over; but that wouldn't persuade us that this was possible. The resources of 
first order logic do not enable us to deduce a contradiction from the proposition 
2 + 1 = 7 or some prime numbers weigh more than Jackie Gleason; but that does 
not lead us to think these propositions possible. We certainly don't in general 
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think that theoremhood in first order logic and logical necessity are coextensive; 
first order logic codifies and systematizes just a part of necessity. 
But secondly, Mackie seems to think that if we stick with what we might call 
"purely logical possibility" (i.e., freedom from contradiction in first order logic) 
then we will reject the idea that there are world-indexed properties. His idea 
seems to be that if we are thinking of purely logical possibility, and if we take 
a possible world to be something like a set of propositions that is maximally 
consistent with respect to first order logic, then we will not properly suppose 
that there are any such things as world-indexed properties. But why not? It isn't 
nearly as easy as that to get rid of world-indexed properties. Perhaps Mackie is 
forgetting that possible worlds are maximal. Given maximality, for any proposi-
tion p and world w, either p is true in w or p is false in w; but then either way 
p has a world indexed property: either it has truth in w or it has falsehood in w. 
And it isn't only propositions that have world-indexed properties under those 
conditions; consider any object x you like-Socrates, let's say-any property 
you like-wisdom, say-and any possible world w in which the proposition 
Socrates exists is true. Either the proposition Socrates is wise is true in w or the 
proposition Socrates is unwise is true in w; so either Socrates has the world-
indexed property being wise in w or the world indexed property being unwise 
in w. In either case, again, Socrates has a world-indexed property. So even if 
we construed possibility as purely logical possibility, we would still be stuck 
(more likely, blessed) with world-indexed properties. The maximality property 
of possible worlds is sufficient for the existence of such properties. Possible 
worlds are connected with each other in such a way that what is true at one 
world partially determines what is true at other worlds just by virtue of the 
maximality property; whether we construe possibility as broadly logical possi-
bility on the one hand or as strictly logical possibility on the other has nothing 
to do with the matter. Hence it is a mistake to say, as Mackie does, that if we 
suppose there are world-indexed properties, then we will be committed to sup-
posing that there are possible propositions not true in any possible worlds; and 
hence it is also a mistake to say, as Mackie's (c) does, that we can properly 
infer (2) from (1) only if we eschew world-indexed properties. 
Finally, consider (d). Mackie's idea seems to be that (4) of the argument-the 
premiss according to which what is logically possible does not vary from possible 
world to possible world-holds only for worlds construed in terms of purely 
logical possibility and necessity, and does not hold if we suppose that there are 
world-indexed properties. But this suggestion seems to be based on Mackie's 
mistaken notion that if we restrict ourselves to purely logically possible worlds, 
then we will not properly suppose that there are world-indexed properties; at 
any rate it is hard to see any other reason for accepting the suggestion, and 
Mackie gives none. 
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So far as I can see, there is here no objection at all to this version of the 
ontological argument. Mackie's only surviving objection, then, is just that (1) 
is not an obvious truth and that it is more abstemious and parsimonious, less 
profligate and extravagant, to accept the denial of (1) rather than (1) itself. I 
find this at best dubious; when we are dealing with propositions of the sort 
Possibly p and Not possibly p it becomes difficult to see which is the more 
abstemious, the less profligate. Consider, for example, the propositions it is 
possible that there be a necessarily existing being that is essentially omniscient 
and its denial. The first is equivalent to the proposition that there is at least one 
necessary being that is essentially omniscient; the second is equivalent to the 
proposition that there are no such beings. Now which of these is the more 
cautious and abstemious? The existential proposition says only that there is at 
least one such being; it therefore rules out just one of the possible answers to 
the question "How many beings of that sort are there?" The negative answer, 
on the other hand, is maximally strong: it rules out all the answers but one. It 
is thus not easy to see why the positive answer should be thought more extravagant 
than the negative. Why should we suppose that there is something more 
extravagant about saying that there is a being of a certain sort, than that there 
is not? Further, is there some reason to think intellectual abstemiousness the 
cardinal intellectual virtue? Do we have reason to think, for example, that it is 
more likely that there are fewer things than more things? 
In any event, one who finds it plausible to think that indeed it is possible that 
there be a maximally great being ought not to be much impressed by the claim 
that it is more abstemious to think that this is not possible. The real question, 
so far as this argument goes, is whether it is or is not reasonable to think that 
the premiss of this argument is true; Mackie has given no reason at all, so far 
as I can see, to think that it is not. 
(c) OTHER THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 
There follows a chapter on Berkeley, and a relatively laborious chapter on 
cosmological arguments for the existence of God. Here Mackie considers the 
sort of argument Swinburne gives in Chapter 7 of The Existence of God. This 
argument is an inductive, or at any rate a nondeductive argument; the evidence 
in question is that there is a complex physical universe, and the hypothesis 
allegedly to be confirmed by this evidence is that there is such a person as God. 
Confirmation, here, can be taken in two ways: we may say the e confirms h if 
and only if P(hle» 112, or that e confirms h if and only if e raises the probability 
of h-if and only if, that is, P(hle&k))>P(hlk) (where k is our background 
information). Arguments of the latter kind Swinburne calls "C-inductive" argu-
ments; and the argument in question is taken to be an argument of that kind. So 
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the Swinburnian claim is that P(hle&k))>P(hlk), where h is the hypothesis that 
God exists, e is the evidence that there is a complex physical universe, and k is 
our background knowledge. Here we encounter "the problem of old evidence": 
k must not be taken to include e (otherwise k&e will be logically equivalent to 
k, in which case P(hl(e&k) could not be greater than P(hlk)). We are therefore 
asked to evaluate the probability that there should be such a person as God on 
our diminished background knowledge-all the things you and I know minus 
the knowledge that there is a complex physical universe"; then we compare this 
probability with the probability of the existence of God on our unreduced back-
ground knowledge (which includes the existence of a complex physical universe.) 
There are problems here, but Mackie does not pursue them. Instead, he objects 
(among other things) that it is hard indeed to see how to determine what either 
of these probabilities might be. And here it is easy to feel sympathy for him. 
Swinburne's approach to the matter makes sense only if we suppose the existence 
of God has an a priori (or intrinsic) probability (see below, p. 129-130), a 
probability on necessary truths alone. Now the bulk of the theistic tradition has 
held that necessarily, if God exists, then God exists necessarily-i.e., in every 
possible world. If this is so, then the a priori probability of the existence of God 
is either I or 0; 1 if God exists, and 0 if not. The Swinburnian style of argument, 
therefore, can be of use only if we are supposing that it is not the case that if 
God exists, then he is a necessary being. But then we face the following extremely 
difficult question: if we suppose that there is such a thing as the a priori probability 
of God's existence, how do we make any kind of estimate at all as to what this 
probability might be? Furthermore, is there any reason to think that such a 
proposition as there is such a person as God or there is a complex physical 
universe has an a priori probability at all? Is there any reason at all to think that 
these propositions have a probability-an objective and intrinsic probability--on 
the proposition that 7+5=12? I can't see that there is; indeed, there is excellent 
reason to think that they do not. But even if there are such probabilities, it would 
seem to be pretty much anyone's guess as to what they are. I think Mackie raises 
some interesting and important issues; his discussion suffers, however, from 
failure to come to grips with the basic issues here, which have to do with the 
nature of probabi Iity. 
Chapter 6 contains an interesting discussion of various moral arguments for 
the existence of God. Here Mackie credits Sidgwick with seeing the fatal flaw 
in any moral argument for the existence of God: 
... he has put his finger on the basic weakness of almost every form of 
moral argument for the existence of a god. A set of beliefs, even if 
they are called 'intuitions,' about how one ought to act cannot be a 
good reason for settling a factual issue, a way of determining what is 
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the case, or even for deciding what to 'believe for practical purposes.' 
Practical choices must be based on factual beliefs, not the other way 
round, though beliefs alone, of course, will not determine choices (112). 
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The idea seems to be this: suppose you accept some moral belief-the belief 
that you ought to treat your dean with more respect, perhaps, or even the belief 
that you do in fact have moral obligations. Suppose, furthermore, that you see 
that the moral belief in question entails some factual belief. It is then improper 
or incorrect, says Mackie, for you to accept the factual belief on the basis of 
your knowledge of the moral truth and its implication of the factual proposition. 
Why so? Perhaps I believe that I ought to do something or other, and also see 
or think I see that I am obliged to do that thing only if I can do so: why can't 
I properly conclude that I can do it? Mackie's answer is that 
There is a direction of supervenience: since what is morally and prac-
tically rational supervenes upon what is the case, what it is rational to 
believe with a view to practice, or to choose to do, must similarly 
supervene upon what it is rational to believe about what is the case (113). 
He neglects to give us a characterization of supervenience (a notoriously 
difficult concept) but he seems to take it along the following lines: a proposition 
A supervenes upon a proposition B if and only if A is true because B is true (and 
perhaps not vice versa). This is extremely vague: how shall we take the 'because' 
here? But in any event Mackie's argument for the epistemic priority of the 
non-moral seems inconclusive at best. Presumably the Detroit Free Press says 
that the Tigers won the World Series because in fact the Tigers did win (and 
not vice versa); but surely it would not be the path of true philosophy to conclude 
that one should not believe that the Tigers won on the basis of what the Free 
Press said. Much more needs to be said before this argument could be taken 
seriously as presenting a general problem for moral arguments to the existence 
of God. 
Next, there is an interesting chapter on a theistic argument/rom consciousness; 
here Mackie considers versions by Locke and Swinburne, who also figures in 
the following chapter on arguments from design. It may come as no surprise to 
learn that by Mackie's lights 
the argument from design cannot be revived. The advance of science 
has destroyed the starting-points which made it initially attractive in the 
eighteenth century, while the general philosophical objections which 
were brought against it even then by Kant and, above all, by Hume, 
remain in effect against Swinburne's restatement of it, and, I surmise, 
against all possible reconstructions (140). 
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II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 
In the longest chapter of the book, Mackie restates and develops his claim 
that the existence of evil constitutes an intellectual difficulty for theists. It is not 
easy, however, to see just what the alleged difficulty is. He begins by saying 
that "The problem of evil, in the sense in which I am using this phrase, is 
essentially a logical problem: it sets the theist the task of clarifying and if possible 
reconciling the several beliefs which he holds" (150). The beliefs in question, 
of course, are 
(1) There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God, 
and 
(2) There is evil. 
«2) may sometimes be specified to some particular form or variety of evil.) 
Mackie says that the question whether the theist holds inconsistent views is the 
one he means to consider; but he sometimes seems to forget this question and 
instead argues something else-that the theist does not have an adequate answer 
to the question: why does God permit evil? Thus, for example, he considers 
Demea's claim that "This life is but a moment in comparison of eternity. The 
present evil phenomena, therefore, are rectified in other regions and in some 
future period of existence." 
Mackie comments as follows: "But, as Cleanthes says, these are 'arbitrary 
suppositions'; we cannot rely on them when the issue whether there is a just, 
benevolent and all-powerful deity is still in doubt" (158). Here he has gone 
astray: if what we are considering is the advertised logical problem then these 
suppositions are entirely in order. Mackie seems to be confusing a defense with 
a theodicy. What is relevant to the logical problem-the question whether the 
theist is guilty of inconsistency-is a defense: an argument to show that the 
propositions in question, contrary to the atheological allegation, are not in fact 
inconsistent. A theodicy, on the other hand, is an attempt to "justify the ways 
of God to man." Less impertinently, it is an attempt to answer the general 
question, why does God permit evil? or the attempt to answer the question, with 
respect to a particular and perhaps peculiarly appalling kind of evil, why does 
God permit that evil? 
These two enterprises are clearly distinct. A defense is perhaps most easily 
thought of as an application of a simple theorem of propositional modal logic: 
(3) [<>(p&r) & «(p&r)~)]?<)(p&q) 
To show that p and q are compatible (that their conjunction is possible) it suffices 
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to find a proposition r which is clearly compatible with p and whose conjunction 
with p entails q. This proposition r need not be a proposition we know to be 
true; nor need it even be probable with respect to our evidence. In fact r can do 
its job perfectly well even if we know that it is false. Suppose we propose to 
argue that Paul's having the experience he does have is compatible with his 
holding nothing but false beliefs about his surroundings: we might then say: "it 
is (broadly logically) possible that Paul is a Putnamian brain in a vat on Alpha 
Centauri, serving as subject in an Alpha Centaurian experiment in which the 
experimenter gives him just the experiences and beliefs he would have if he 
were home in Grand Rapids watching television: then he would be having just 
the experiences he is having (Paul is now home watching television) but all of 
his beliefs about his surrounding would be false." It would not be apposite, here, 
to remark that the supposition that Paul is being thus mishandled by Alpha 
Centaurians is a merely arbitrary supposition, or known to be false, or unlikely 
with respect to our evidence. It can be all those things and still perform its 
function perfectly well. To do that, it needs to meet only two conditions: it must 
be compatible with one of the propositions we are trying to show consistent, 
and in conjunction with that one must entail the other. (I apologize for thus 
belaboring the obvious.) It is thus clear that a defense and a theodicy should be 
clearly and sharply distinguished: I might have a good argument to show that 
(I) is not incompatible with (2), but no good idea at all as to why, as a matter 
of fact, God does permit the evil we find. In particular, the r you propose in 
your defense might serve its function perfectly well even if it isn't a successful 
contribution to theodicy. (Perhaps you have no reason to think r is true; perhaps, 
indeed, r is wholly implausible.) 
To return to Mackie and his comments on Demea's arbitrary suppositions": 
if what is under consideration is, as Mackie says, the logical problem of evil, 
then presumably we are thinking of these suppositions as playing r in the above 
theorem with (1) and (2) as p and q. But then the fact that these considerations 
are merely arbitrary is neither here nor there. It is not necessary that the consid-
erations in question be true, or known to be true, or probable, or plausible, or 
non-arbitrary, or anything of the sort. These considerations are relevant to a 
theodicy, but not to a defense. If, on the other hand, Mackie is addressing himself 
here to questions of theodicy, then (contrary to his advertised intentions) he is 
no longer concerning himself with the logical problem of evil; he is instead 
suggesting that the theist seems to have no very good answer to the question: 
why does God permit the evil he does permit? This may be true (I think it is 
true) but it isn't at all clear either that this constitutes something like a philosoph-
ical difficulty for the theist, or that it somehow renders theism improbable or 
unlikely. 
Suggesting that the free will defense is "the only solution to the problem of 
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evil that has any chance of succeeding": Mackie turns his attention to that defense, 
aiming to show that this hope is doomed to disappointment. But here again there 
seems to be pervasive confusion of issues of defense with issues of theodicy. 
Considering the extension of the free will defense to natural evil (by taking as 
r a proposition making reference to the malevolent activity of Satan and his 
cohorts) Mackie says: 
Formally, no doubt, this is possible; but it is another of what Cleanthes 
called arbitrary suppositions. While we have a direct acquaintance with 
some wrong human choices--our own-and our everyday understanding 
extends to the recognition of the like choices of other human beings, 
we have no such knowledge of the activities of angels, fallen or other-
wise: these are at best part of the religious hypothesis which is still in 
dispute, and cannot be relied upon to give it any positive support. This 
is at most a possible explanation of natural evils ... (162-163)(Mackie' s 
italics). 
This leads us to suspect, once more, that Mackie is proposing to discuss, not 
defense, but theodicy:9 two pages later, however, he says "Since I am charging 
the theist with holding incompatible beliefs, it is his conception of good, evil 
and so on that are in play ... "; this suggests, on the other hand, that it is defense, 
not theodicy that is relevant. There is therefore considerable difficulty in seeing 
just what aspect of the problem of evil Mackie means to address. 
In any event the theist will be likely to concede that the free will defender's 
r is, as Mackie says, only a possible explanation of evil-that is, only a defense. 
But he also attempts to argue that it is not even that. He begins by pointing out 
(in effect) that the free will defense clearly requires a libertarian conception of 
freedom-a conception according to which it is not possible both that all of a 
person's actions be causally determined by factors outside his control and that 
some of them be free. He then suggests that "There are two great difficulties 
for this position, that of giving evidence for it, and that of even saying just what 
contra-causal freedom would be" (166). The first of these difficulties, again, is 
not relevant to the free will defense taken as defense. The second alleged diffi-
culty, so far as I can make it out, is that Mackie thinks that if a person is not 
caused to make the choices he makes, then these choices must be merely random, 
in something like the way in which certain quantum effects are random; but if 
a person's free action stem from merely random choices, then presumably they 
would have no special value. Here there are several interesting and important 
topics; I have no space to enter them. Let me just note that the theist is already 
committed to the idea that some actions are not merely random even though the 
agent in question is not caused to perform those actions (or if caused to perform 
them, is caused to do so only by himself): God's actions would fit this category. 
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God isn't caused to perform the actions he does; he could have done otherwise 
than he has done; but of course his actions are in no relevant sense merely random. 
What is needed here is an argument for the claim that necessarily, if an agent 
is not caused to do what he does, then his action is merely random or chance; 
this isn't just obvious after all. (As a matter of fact it seems closer to being 
outrageous than obvious.) Why shouldn't it be, for example, that I am not caused 
to write this review by forces outside my control and (even given the past causal 
history of the world) could have refrained from doing so, while nonetheless my 
action is not merely random? Why should we think that if God was not caused 
to create the world, or to provide redemption for his creatures, then his actions 
in so doing were merely random? I can't see any reason at all for making this 
supposition. If Mackie had a good reason, however, then he would have an 
initially good argument against theism itself (not just the free will defense), for 
it is clearly part of most varieties of theism to hold that God's actions are not 
caused by anything outside himself but nonetheless are not random. 
Mackie next examines a specific formulation of the free will defense-the 
formulation I gave in The Nature of Necessity. I shall resist the temptation to 
engage in extensive self-justification; let me say simply that Mackie's discussion 
is vitiated by his misunderstanding transworld depravity: 
Plantinga assumes that Curley is so corrupt that 'every world God could 
have actualized is such that if Curley is significantly free in it, he takes 
at least one wrong action.' Curley Smith suffers from what Plantinga 
calls "trans world depravity": in whatever world he exists, ifhe is signific-
antly free he commits some wrong actions: this Plantinga takes to be a 
fact about Curley's essence (174). 
But here there is an unfortunate lapse. If Curley suffers from transworld depravity, 
then every world God could have weakly actualized is such that if Curley is 
significantly free in it, then he performs at least one wrong action in it. Mackie 
quotes this, and then apparently attempts to restate it by saying that if Curley 
suffers from transworld depravity, then every world in which Curley exists is 
such that if he is significantly free in it, then he goes wrong in it. But of course 
the second isn't a paraphrase of the first and does not follow from it. The second 
would follow from the first only if the proposition every possible world is a 
world God could have weakly actualized were a necessary truth. The central 
argument of the free will defense, however, is just for the conclusion that this 
proposition is not necessarily true. Indeed, the burden of the Free Will Defense 
is that this proposition is necessarily false; the conclusion of its central argument 
is that it is necessary that there are some possible worlds God could not have 
weakly actualized. As Mackie puts the matter, a person suffers from transworld 
depravity if and only if he goes wrong in every world in which he exists and is 
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significantly free. But if this were correct, transworld depravity (as defined for 
persons, not for essences) would be a property that could be had only by beings 
(abstract objects such as numbers, and (more contentiously) material objects) 
that had essentially the properly of lacking significant freedom. But then, of 
course, it would not be possible that there be significantly free creatures that 
suffer from transworld depravity, so that the whole free will defense would 
collapse. 
But to say that I suffer from transworld depravity is not to say that there is 
no possible world at all in which I am significantly free and always do only 
what is right; it is only to say that none of the worlds God could have weakly 
actualized is one in which I am significantly free and always do only what is 
right. If I suffer from trans world depravity, then for any such world W there is 
an action A such that I am significantly free with respecttoA in W, and such that 
(a) if God had strongly actualized T(W), (the largest state of affairs he 
strongly actualizes in W) then I would have gone wrong with respect 
to A. 
Such counterfactuals of freedom as (a) are contingently true, not necessarily 
true. Suppose God knew in advance (before he created Adam and Eve) that if 
he were to create Eve and cause her to be significantly free with respect to the 
action of choosing the apple, then she would take the apple. This bit of knowledge 
on his part is knowledge of a contingent truth, not a necessary truth. What he 
knows is what Eve would in fact freely do, if he were to do certain things; it 
would of course be possible that he do those same things and Eve refrain from 
taking the apple. But to say that someone suffers from transworld depravity is 
really to assert that a lot of such counterfactuals of freedom are true of her. 
Transworld depravity, therefore, is not, as on Mackie's account, an essential 
property of those (if any) who are afflicted with it; it is instead a contingent 
property of such unfortunates. Even if Curley suffers from transworld depravity, 
there are plenty of possible worlds in which he exists and is significantly free 
and always does only what is right. 
Now Mackie's main objection to the Free Will Defense seems to be the claim 
that on his (mistaken) understanding of transworld depravity, it is not possible 
(contrary to the Free Will Defender's claim) both that God be omnipotent and 
that there be free creatures all of whom suffer from transworld depravity. Here, 
of course, he is right; indeed, given his conception of trans world depravity it is 
not possible that there be any free creatures who suffer from trans world depravity 
at all, whether or not God is omnipotent. This objection, therefore, has nothing 
but misunderstanding to recommend it. 
So far as I can see, the only comment of any significance Mackie makes on 
the free will defense is a question:"how could there be logically contingent states 
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of affairs, which an omnipotent god would have to accept and put up with?" 
This is really the question whether there are or could be counterfactuals of 
freedom of the sort mentioned above; more particularly, it is the question whether 
it is possible that any such counterfactuals of freedom are true, and were true 
prior to God's creating free creatures. Robert Adams has interesting things to 
say about this question. 10 I am inclined to believe that Adams' arguments against 
counterfactuals of freedom are inconclusive." The important point to see here, 
however, is that the atheological objector needs counterfactuals of freedom more 
than the free will defender does. If there are no true counterfactuals of freedom, 
the free will defender's task should be easier, not harder; for on that supposition 
God would not have been able to have as detailed knowledge of what would 
happen if he were to strongly actualize various states of affaiars T(W) for any 
possible world Was he would on the contrary supposition (Op Cit. pp. 379). In 
particular he would not have been able to have the same detailed knowledge as 
to what would happen if he were to create free creatures. 
III. IS THEISM A HYPOTHESIS? 
In his final chapter ("Conclusions and Implications") Mackie argues that the 
balance of probability lies against theism and in favor of atheism. He also 
considers the moral and practical effects of theism versus atheism, suspecting 
that there is "positive correlation between atheism and virtue" (255). Believers 
will be grateful, however, for his magnanimity in generously conceding that 
"even theists are not necessarily narrow minded dogmatists, intolerant perse-
cutors, or propagators of timid credulity and a crudely calculating selfish version 
of morality itself." (260). 
Rather than explore this unpromising line, I wish in this last section to register 
and explain some misgivings about Mackie's whole enterprise. I have argued 
so far that his treatment of specific issues (the argument from miracles, the 
ontological argument, the problem of evil) is unsatisfactory; but it is also clear, 
I think, that Mackie's whole project makes presuppositions that are deeply ques-
tionable. The most important and debilitating of these is his taking it for granted 
that theism or belief in God is a scientific hypothesis, or a quasi-scientific 
hypothesis, or relevantly like a scientific hypothesis. Before turning to that topic, 
however, I shall first point out a serious incompleteness in Mackie's project and 
a serious problem with probability. (On all three of these topics I will have time 
to do no more than ask some questions and issue what may appear to be unduly 
dogmatic obiter dicta.) 
(a) First, the incompleteness. Mackie concludes that "In the end, therefore, 
we can agree with what Laplace said about God: we have no need of that 
hypothesis" (253); he goes on to claim that "The balance of probabilities, there-
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fore, comes out strongly against the existence of a god." He clearly takes it for 
granted, furthennore, that if the balance of probabilities comes out as he says 
it does, then there is no case for theism and the theist stands revealed as somehow 
irrational or intellectually deficient or perhaps intellectually out of line; as he 
puts it, "it would appear from our discussion so far that the central doctrines of 
theism, literally interpreted, cannot be rationally defended." Some of the most 
interesting issues surrounding the book arise here. 
Now Mackie believes he has shown that the central doctrines of theism are 
not rational or rationally defensible because they are not probable with respect 
to what he takes to be the relevant evidence. But what does he mean here by 
"rational"? How is he using this protean tenn? Suppose he is right in thinking 
that it would be irrational to be theist if theistic belief is not probable: what is 
this property of irrationality that would then afflict theism or theists? Mackie 
doesn't say. Is a belief rational if and only if it is among the deliverances of 
reason? or is rationality, instead, to be construed as a matter of epistemic duty 
fulfillment, as Roderick Chisholm suggests? Or should it perhaps be thought of 
as a matter of coherence, construed in Bayesian fashion or some other way-as 
with Lehrer, for example? Or is it instead a matter of reliability of belief fonnation, 
as with Goldman, Dretske and Alston? Or (still another possibility) is it a matter 
of a belief's being fonned by cognitive faculties working properly in an environ-
ment for which they are suited? Or what? Mackie doesn't say. These questions 
are hotly debated by contemporary epistemologists. The answers to them, further-
more, are of obvious and intense relevance to Mackie's project. Nevertheless 
he doesn't discuss the questions at all; he doesn't ask what rationality is, or what 
it is to be rational; he proceeds as if all this is perfectly clear. This gives the 
whole discussion an air of superficiality or ungroundedness. 
(b) Although Mackie does not discuss the nature of rationality, it is clear that 
he thinks theistic belief is irrational if it is not appropriately probable, probable 
with respect to the relevant body of evidence. This brings me to my second 
comment. Suppose we knew which body of propositions it is with respect to 
which theism must be more probable than not in order to be rationally acceptable: 
how shall we understand probability here? We are thinking of the probability of 
theism, the belief that there is such a person as God. What is the relevant 
conception of probability? Mackie gives us a cryptic hint: 
The probabilities with which we shall be most concerned are epistemic 
ones: the epistemic probability of a certain statement relative to some 
body of infonnation is a measure of the degree of support that that 
infonnation gives to that statement, or, equivalently, of the degree or 
belief that it is reasonable to give to that statement on the basis of that 
infonnation (10). 
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One further clue: his frequent appeals to the calculus of probabilities suggests 
that he thinks probability, however exactly it is to be construed, conforms to 
that calculus. 
But how, more specifically, is he construing probability? First (contrary to 
the above quotation) he cannot sensibly take probability as a measure of degree 
of rational belief; for then it would be circular in excels is to argue, as he does 
argue, that since theistic belief is not probable with respect to the relevant 
evidence, it is not rational to accept it. Secondly, a subjectivist or personalist 
conception of probability, according to which probability is relativised to a person 
and serves substantially as a measure of degree of belief, won't be relevant to 
his considerations. On the personalist conception, a conditional probability PiAl 
B) is to be seen as at any rate equivalent to P,.(A&B)lPlB), where Ps is S's 
credence function; thus PiAIB) tells us what the ratio is between S's degree of 
belief in A&B and S's degree of belief in B. But then given the theist's credence 
function, theism will not be at all improbable on the relevant evidence. Of course 
it will be improbable on the relevant evidence given Mackie's credence function; 
but then his claim that theism is improbable on that evidence would be a merely 
autobiographical remark about his own credence function, having the philosoph-
ical interest characteristic of autobiographical remarks. 
So clearly enough Mackie must be accepting some objectivist conception of 
probability. But presumably frequency and propensity accounts will not be 
relevant when our question is the probability of the existence of God with respect 
to the body of evidence in question. '2 This leaves only the logical theory of 
probabilityl3; and this seems to be the one Mackie has in mind. On this conception, 
there is a quasi-logical, wholly objective relation of probability between any two 
statements, or any two statements of a relevant domain. 
But here the problem is with prior probabilities. In the first place, the bulk 
of the theistic tradition has held that God is a necessary being; a being such that 
there is no possible world in which he does not exist. If so, however, then 
according to the logical theory the a priori probability of God's existence will 
be I; and it follows by the probability calculus that the same goes for the 
conditional probability of God's existence on any evidence you care to specify. 
Mackie's approach is therefore irrelevant to the bulk of traditional thinking about 
God. True, he offers some (mainly confused, as I see it) objections to the 
ontological argument; but of course we have the example of Aquinas and others 
to show that one needn't accept the ontological argument to hold that God is it 
necessary being, in the above sense. 
But suppose we ignore this difficulty; suppose we join Mackie in assuming, 
for the nonce, that if there is such a person as God, he is a contingent being. 
Suppose we let T be the "hypothesis" that there is such a person as God, and E 
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be the relevant body of total evidence, whatever exactly that is. Then according 
to a simple form of Bayes' Theorem, 
P(T! E) = pen x p(Eln 
peE) 
where pen and peE) are the intrinsic or a priori probability of these propositions: 
their probability on tautological evidence such as PV-P. But here we strike a 
problem of considerable significance: is there any reason to think that such 
propositions as E and T have a probability on a tautology, or any other necessary 
truth? Is the idea that there is some ratio or proportion min such that min possible 
worlds contain God? I don't see the slightest reason to think there are any such 
proportions or any such a priori probabilities; in fact there is good reason to 
think that there aren't any. 
A brief argument: if contingent propositions in general have an a priori prob-
ability on tautological evidence, then presumably the members of any collection 
of mutually exclusive (in pairs) and jointly exhaustive propositions of equal 
content should have the same a priori probability. 14 But then the members of a 
countably infinite collection of the sort There are no horses, there is just 1 horse, 
there are just 2 horses, ... will all have the same a priori probability, in which 
case their probability will be zero. (Loc cit.) (It is for this reason that Camap 
and others have held that the a priori probability of universal generalizations 
should be thought of as zero; such a generalization is equivalent to the first 
member of such a set of propositions.) It follows that for any kind of object 
such that, for any natural number n it is possible that there be just n objects of 
that kind, the a priori probability, for any number n, that there are just n objects 
of that kind is zero. Now say that a person S has been created* by God if and 
only if S has been created by God or created by some being who has been 
created* by God. If traditional theism is true, it is a necessary truth that any 
nondivine persons have been created* by God. But it is possible (if, as we are 
assuming, God is not a necessary being) that there be human beings who are 
not created* by God. Indeed, for any number n it is possible that there be n 
such human beings. The a priori probability that there are no such human beings, 
then, is zero, and hence the a priori probability that there is at least one such 
person is 1. But then it follows that the a priori probability of the existence of 
God is zero. On the other hand, it is also possible that there be human beings 
created by God; and for any number n it is possible that there be n such human 
beings. But then the a priori probability of the existence of God is 1. So suppose 
the proposition that there is such a person as God is contingent and has an a 
priori probability: then it looks as if there is excellent reason to hold that the 
probability in question is 1, but equally good reason to hold that it is zero. There 
seems to be no satisfactory way to assign a priori probabilities to this proposition. 
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I am therefore disinclined to think that such propositions have an a priori prob-
ability at all. 
But let us suppose that they do. How would we tell what that probability was? 
Mackie estimates this probability as low: 
Against the rival theistic hypothesis we should have to score the (signif-
icant) improbability that if there were a god he (or it) would create a 
world with causal laws, and one with our specific causal laws and 
constants, but also the great improbability of there being a process of 
the unmediated fulfillment of will, and, besides, the basic improbability 
of their being a god at all. Whatever initial improbability there may be 
in the unexplained brute fact that there is a world, there is a far greater 
initial improbability in what the theist has to assert as the unexplained 
brute fact that there is a god capable of creating a world (252-253). 
But how does Mackie (or anyone else) estimate these probabilities? Do we have 
any way at all of making even a reasonably good guess? Imagine possible worlds 
as uniforn11y distributed throughout a sort of bounded logical space (a giant 
sphere, let's say.) What is the proportion of that space occupied by possible 
worlds in which God exists? The theistic tradition (for the most part) has held 
that God exists in all possible worlds, but suppose we continue to assume that 
false: what would a good guess be? 114? 24/25? It seems to be anyone's guess, 
and any guess will be about as good as any other. Mackie thinks this probability 
is very low; but why wouldn't it be equally sensible to estimate it as very 
high-.99, for example? 
My guess is that Mackie's answer to a question such as this would be in terms 
of economy. Swinburne, on the other hand, opts for simplicity in this context: 
he thinks the a priori or intrinsic probability of a hypothesis is a function of its 
simplicity. But both of these seem deeply problematic. What reason is there to 
think that reality is fundamentally simple? If we believe the world was created 
by God, we may also plausibly think that it will display a sort of rationality and 
simplicity (even though, as Einstein said, the Lord God may be subtle). But if 
we have nothing of that sort to go on, why should we think that what is simple 
is more likely than what is complex? Similar remarks apply to Mackie's penchant 
for the economical. Why should we suppose that reality prefers economy? Desert 
landscapes and the Sonoran wilderness are indeed attractive; but so are luxuriant 
tropical gardens and the Olympic Peninsula. Mackie seems to think it is a priori 
likely that there are fewer things than more. Others disagree; indeed, many have 
thought it likely that there be as many things as there can be, a view which 
receives a bizarre sort of support from recent developments in contemporary 
physics. But is there really any reason to suppose that either of these views is 
correct? 
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Mackie's procedure and modes of argument, therefore, require that we make 
these estimates of a priori probabilities. There seems no reason at all, however, 
to think there are any such probabilities; and even if there are, it is anyone's 
guess as to what their value might be. 
(c) I tum finally to my most serious misgiving about Mackie's project. Perhaps 
we can best proceed by asking a couple of questions. First: he seems simply to 
take it for granted that the correct way to go about evaluating the rational 
acceptability of belief in God is to evaluate arguments for and against the existence 
of God. But presumably this would not be appropriate with respect to our belief, 
say, in the past, or in an external world, or other minds. Why is it appropriate 
here? Second, Mackie assumes that if none of the arguments for theism of the 
sorts he considers are successful, then there is no "case for" theism, and theists 
stand revealed as somehow cognitively subpar or intellectually out of line. But 
why make an assumption like that? It certainly isn't just obvious or self-evident; 
it is both controversial and controverted. Why does he make this assumption? 
Third, Mackie thinks the balance of probability lies against theism: theism is 
not as probable as its denial. But probable with respect to what? What is the 
body of belief or knowledge or evidence such that theism is rationally acceptable 
or rationally defensible if and only if it is probable with respect to that body of 
propositions? With respect to what body of knowledge or belief must theism 
work to show itself approved? Mackie says nothing at all on this head; yet surely 
it is one of the most important issues in this entire area. What shall we take, 
here, to be the relevant total evidence? (If the theist's total evidence includes, 
say, the proposition that there is such a person as God, then obviously enough 
his theism will be more probable than not with respect to his total evidence.) 
So what is the total evidence? Mackie's practice indicates that he takes it to 
include a certain amount of logic and probability theory, common sense beliefs 
in an external material world, other persons, and the past, the main outlines of 
contemporary science, and perhaps some maxims of proper theory construction, 
such as that one ought to prefer the more economical hypothesis to the less. But 
why suppose that theism is rationally acceptable only if it is more probable than 
not with respect to that body of evidence? 
The answer to these questions, clearly enough, is that Mackie throughout 
assumes that theism is or is relevantly like a scientific hypothesis-something 
like Special Relativity, for example, or Quantum Mechanics, or the Theory of 
Evolution. (And when we see this point, it helps to explain the attraction of 
economy for Mackie; presumably if a pair of scientific hypotheses are otherwise 
on a par, the more economical one gets the nod.) Speaking of religious experience, 
he makes the following characteristic remark: "Here, as elsewhere, the super-
naturalist hypothesis fails because there is an adequate and much more economical 
naturalistic alternative" (198). Clearly this remark is relevant only if we think 
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of belief in God as or as like a sort of scientific hypothesis, a theory designed 
to explain some body of evidence, and acceptable to the degree that it explains 
that evidence. On this way of looking at the matter, there is a relevant body of 
evidence shared by believer and unbeliever alike; theism is a hypothesis designed 
to explain that body of evidence; and theism is rationally defensible only to the 
extent that it is a good explanation thereof. 
But why should we think of theism like this? Clearly there are perfectly sensible 
alternatives. Consider our beliefs about the past: obviously one could take a 
Mackie-like view here as well. One could hold that our beliefs about the past 
are best thought of as like a scientific hypothesis, designed to explain such 
present phenomena as (among other things) apparent memories; and if there were 
a more "economical" explanation of these phenomena that did not postulate past 
facts, then our usual beliefs in the past "could not be rationally defended." But 
here this seems clearly mistaken; the availability of such an "explanation" 
wouldn't in any way tell against our ordinary belief that there has really been a 
past. Why couldn't the same hold for theism? 
In responding to Hume, Thomas Reid brilliantly discusses a similar network 
of questions. Here the topic under discussion is not God, but material objects 
or an external world. Suppose it is proposed that my belief in material objects 
is "rationally defensible" only if it is more probable than not with respect to a 
body of knowledge that includes no physical object propositions but only, say, 
self-evident truths together with experiential propositions specifying how I am 
appeared to. Add (as the history of modern philosophy strongly suggests) that 
it is impossible to show that physical object statements are more probable than 
not with respect to such a body of evidence; or add, more strongly, that in fact 
physical object propositions are not more probable than not with respect to such 
propositions. What would follow from that? It is one of Reid's most important 
and enduring contributions to point out that nothing of much interest would 
follow from that. In particular it would not follow that belief in physical objects 
ought to be discouraged as somehow improper, or irrational, or intellectually 
out of order. 
But why, then, should we think it follows in the case of theism? Suppose 
theistic belief is not more probable than not with respect to the body of belief 
with respect to which Mackie evaluates it: why should we conclude that it is not 
rationally defensible? Perhaps it is perfectly rational to take belief in God in the 
way we ordinarily take belief in other minds, material objects, the past, and the 
like. Why isn't it perfectly sensible to start with belief in God? Why does belief 
in God have to be probable with respect to some other body of evidence in order 
to be rationally defensible? Mackie doesn't say; he doesn't so much as raise the 
question. 
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